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a b s t r a c t
We associate with any game G another game, which is a variant of it, and which we
call bck(G). Winning strategies for bck(G) have a lower recursive degree than winning
strategies for G: if a player has a winning strategy of recursive degree 1 over G, then it has
a recursive winning strategy over bck(G), and vice versa. Through bck(G)we can express
in algorithmic form, as a recursive winning strategy, many (but not all) common proofs
of non-constructive Mathematics, namely exactly the theorems of the sub-classical logic
Limit Computable Mathematics (Hayashi (2006) [6], Hayashi and Nakata (2001) [7]).
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1. Introduction
We consider a class of games with possibly infinite plays. We associate with any game G in this class another game in the
same class, a variant of Gwhich we call bck(G). We plan to use games of the form bck(G) as a semantics for a sub-classical
logic, Limit Computable Mathematics, or LCM for short (see [6] and Appendix).
In the terminology of [4,5], bck(G) consists of all plays with backtracking over G, whose Interaction Sequence (f , V )
satisfies ∀x > 0.∃n.f (x) = f n(x − 1). In the terminology of Hyland–Ong [9], bck(G) consists of all plays in which both
players use innocent strategies always pointing within the current thread of the play. The interest of bck(G), however, lies
in the fact that it also has a simple and direct definition, as we will explain. We first describe bck(G), then we sketch the use
we have in mind for it.
In the case G is the game of Chess, we can informally describe bck(G) as follows. bck(G) is a variant of Chess we
could call ‘‘Chess with backtracking’’, in which both players can ‘‘learn’’ better moves by trial-and-error. In Chess with
backtracking, each player can decide that he hasmade amistake at some previousmove, and retract it. All moves in between
are then forgotten. A motivation for this game could be teaching Chess to beginners. If you suffer checkmate in Chess with
backtracking, you do not necessarily lose: you can come back to some previous position of the chessboard, and select amove
from the position you consider to be better. However, each player is allowed to improve only finitely many times the move
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from any given position of the chessboard. The first player changing a move infinitely many times loses. We give a name
to this ‘‘retracting’’: we call it ‘‘1-backtracking’’. Both players can perform ‘‘1-backtracking’’. The aim of 1-backtracking is to
learn better moves. We call bck(G) the ‘‘1-backtracking’’ version of G.
In bck(G), as in Chess with backtracking, a player can come back to the same position x of G only finitely many times,
otherwise he loses. The idea is that a player can change several times his move from x in order to make it progressively
better. A player’s first choice may be thoughtless, but his next choice depends on his previous experience in the play and
will be better. If the player makes some mistakes, again he can exploit his experience to select some even better move, and
so on. However, any player has only a finite time to improve his move, and eventually he must stop changing his mind.
He must provide, for any position x, a last and definitive choice for his move from x. We require that there is a last move
from the initial position of G, a last move from this last move, and so forth. In this way, every play β in bck(G) is associated
with some play β(1) in G, made only of ‘‘last moves’’ (Definition 7.4). As usual, a player who does not move, or who does
an irregular move loses. Using β(1), we can define the winner of a possibly infinite play β in bck(G): it is the winner of the
associated play β(1) in G.
In spite of the great difference between G and bck(G), if a player has a winning strategy for G, then he has a winning
strategy for the bck(G), and viceversa. Besides, winning strategies for bck(G) have a lower recursive degree than winning
strategy for G. We now explain what this latter statement means.
Assume that O is any recursive degree and O′ is the jump of O. We will include the definitions of recursive degree and
jump in Section 6: for the moment, the reader may assume thatO = 0 = the set of recursive maps andO′ = 1 = the set of
the maps recursive in the Halting Problem. Fix any game G which can be described in O. Assume either G is a Tarski game,
or players alternate in G.1 Then we will prove:
Theorem 1. If a player p has some winning strategy for G, of recursive degree O′, then p has some winning strategy for bck(G),
of recursive degree O.
Theorem 2. Conversely, if a player p has some winning strategy for bck(G), of recursive degree O, then p has some winning
strategy for G, of recursive degree O′.
The application we have in mind for bck(G) are Tarski games. Fix any (closed) formula A of Peano Arithmetic in the
connectives∨,∧, ∃,∀. Let G be the Tarski game for A (see Section 2 for details). It is known that we have a winning strategy
for G if and only if A is true, andwe have a recursive winning strategy for A if and only if there is a constructive proof of A. For
instance, if A is EM1 (Excluded Middle for semi-decidable statements, see Section 2), then there is a winning strategy for G,
but no recursive winning strategy, because EM1 is true, but it has no constructive proof. However, significantly, in this case
we have a recursivewinning strategy for bck(G) (see Section 3). This pattern is exhibited inmanywell-known combinatorial
and algebraic theorems (some examples are given in Section 4). In bck(G), we do not have to provide a winning move at
once, but we can start by choosing some move, and later we can change it, if we lose the game G, using the experience we
gathered from the (temporary) defeat. Recursive winning strategies for bck(G)may be interpreted as algorithms ‘‘learning
by trial-and-error’’ winning moves in G.
The idea is therefore to usebck(G) in order to associatemany commonnon-constructive theoremswith somealgorithmic
content, expressed by the winning strategy for bck(G). Theorems 1 and 2 above have an interesting corollary: they
characterize for which games G we have a recursive winning strategy for bck(G). If G is a Tarski game we have a recursive
winning strategy over bck(G) if and only if we have a winning strategy of G of recursive degree 1 (i.e., recursive in an oracle
for the Halting problem). Even if G and bck(G) are ‘‘equivalent’’ games, bck(G) is a version of G for which we have ‘‘more
concrete’’ winning strategies. Notice that there are also some recursive games G for which we have winning strategies for
G, but no recursive winning strategy for G, nor for bck(G). This is the case of the game G interpreting EM2 (Excluded Middle
for degree 2 formulas, see Corollary 1.3). This result settles an open problem in [4], p. 5: ‘‘1-backtracking’’ (called ‘‘simple
backtracking’’ in [4]) and ‘‘backtracking’’ are not equivalent.
Theorems 1 and 2 have another interesting corollary: they characterize true formulas of Limit Computable Mathematics
[6] in terms of games. For a brief introduction to LCMwe refer to Appendix. In [6], there is an interpretation for formulas true
in LCM. Intuitively, a formula is true in LCM if we may ‘‘learn’’ that A is true by trial-and-error. ‘‘Learnable’’ formulas are a
proper subset of true formulas (for instance, EM2 is true and not learnable). For this reason, LCM is also called: ‘‘Mathematics
based on learning’’.
Let A be a formula in the connectives ∨,∧, ∃,∀, and let G be the Tarski game associated with A. It is known that A is a
theoremof LCM if and only if there is awinning strategy forG of recursive degree 1. If we combine this remarkwith our result
about bck(G), we conclude that A is a theorem of LCM if and only if there is a recursive winning strategy for bck(G). We
can interpret this result as follows: we may ‘‘learn’’ A by trial-and-error, if and only if we have a recursive winning strategy
with 1-backtracking for the Tarski game associated with A. As far as we know, 1-backtracking games are the first complete
characterization of ‘‘learnable’’ formulas in terms of games with effectively computable strategies.
This is the plan of the paper. In Section 2 we define the class of games we consider, and we recall the notion of Tarski
game. In Section 3 we define bck(G). In Section 4 we give some examples of games with 1-backtracking. In Section 5 we
1 In the actual proof of Theorem 2, we replace this hypothesis with a weaker one, Liveness (see Section 5 for a discussion).
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discuss Liveness, a generalization of the condition that players alternate in the game. In Section 6 we prove that winning
strategies for bck(G) of degree 0 may be transformed into winning strategies for G of degree 1. This result does not require
hypotheses on G. In Section 7, we prove the converse, that winning strategies for G of degree 1 may be transformed into
winning strategies for bck(G) of degree 0. This result requires the Liveness hypothesis on G. In Section 8 we derive the
characterization of LCM as corollary. Eventually, in Section 9 we discuss conclusions and future works, and in Appendix we
include a brief introduction to LCM.
2. Games and Tarski games
In this section we define the notion of game we consider in this paper, with possibly infinite plays, and the particular
case of Tarski games, in which all plays are finite. For a motivation of the definition of game we choose we refer to [10].
We introduce first a notion of tree. We denote the concatenation of two lists x, y by x@y. We write x ≤ y for ‘‘x is a prefix
of y’’, and x < y for x ≤ y and x 6= y. Trees, in our presentation, are particular sets of lists, as stated in the next definition.
Definition 1 (Trees and Tree Terminology).
1. (Trees) A tree T over a setM is some set of lists 〈∗,m1, . . . ,mk〉, with m1, . . . ,mk ∈ M , including 〈∗〉, and closed under
non-empty prefix: if x ∈ T and 〈〉 6= y ≤ x, then y ∈ T .
2. (Children) 〈∗〉 is the root of T . If x, x@〈m〉 ∈ T , we say that x is the father of x@〈m〉 in T , and that x@〈m〉 is a child of x in
T . Any x@〈m′〉 is a brother of x@〈m〉. If x ≤ ywe say that x is an ancestor of y, and that y is a descendant of x. x is a proper
ancestor of y and y a proper descendant of x if x < y.
3. (Branches) A leaf is any x ∈ T with no children. A branch of T is either any 〈∗,m1, . . . ,mk〉 ∈ T , or any infinite list
〈∗,m1,m2, . . . ,mk, . . .〉whose finite prefixes are all in T . In the second case we say that the branch is infinite.
4. (Morphisms) A tree morphism is any map φ : T → U , mapping the root of T into the root of U , and any child of any x ∈ T
into some child of φ(x) ∈ U . φ is a tree isomorphism if φ is bijective.
The root of T is the list 〈∗〉. The children of the root are all lists 〈∗,m1〉 ∈ T , the children of each 〈∗,m1〉 ∈ T are all
〈∗,m1,m2〉 ∈ T , and so forth. A branch which is maximal w.r.t. prefix ordering is either a leaf or an infinite branch. We
introduce our notion of game.
Definition 2 (Games). A game between two players, called E (Eloise) andA (Abelard) is any list G = 〈∗,M, T , turn,WE ,
WA〉, where:
1. ∗ is a symbol, which we call the start of the game.
2. M is a set, which we call the set of moves of G.
3. T is a tree overM , which we call the set of positions of G.
4. turn is some map : T → {E,A}.
5. (WE ,WA) is a partition of the infinite branches of T , that is:WE ∩WA = ∅ andWE ∪WA = {all infinite branches of T }.
We introduce now some game terminology.
Definition 3 (Game Terminology).
1. (Legal Moves) We call p = turn(x) the player moving from position x. If x, x@〈m〉 ∈ T , we say thatm is a legal move of p
from position x, a move for short.
2. (Plays and winners) A play of G is any finite or infinite branch of T . We say that player p = E,Awins the play β if either
β is a finite branch of T and turn(β) 6= p, or β is an infinite branch and β ∈ Wp. The other player is the loser of the play.
We call the elements of T the positions of the game, because from the list of all previous moves we can determine the
current status of a play. The root 〈∗〉 of T is called the initial position of the game. The player pmoving from position x ∈ T ,
either E or A, is by definition p = turn(x). Player p0 = Turn(〈∗〉) moves from the initial position, selecting some legal
move m1 (some m1 ∈ M such that 〈∗,m1〉 ∈ T ). Player p1 = turn(〈∗,m1〉) moves next, from position 〈∗,m1〉, selecting
some legal movem2 ∈ M . The play continues in this way. Players do not always move in an alternating fashion. After k legal
moves, the position of the game is x = 〈∗,m1, . . . ,mk〉 ∈ T . If x is a leaf, there are no children of x, and therefore no legal
moves from x. x is a finite maximal play (without proper extensions). p = turn(x), the next player moving from x, is the
loser of x. We assume that a play may terminate at anymoment, even if x is not a leaf, because the player moving next drops
out of the play. Therefore each position can also be seen as a complete play. The loser in any finite play x is p = turn(x), the
first player who should move and does not (either because he does not want to, or because he cannot, since x is a leaf). If a
player β continues forever, we say that it is won by E (byA) if β ∈ WE (if β ∈ WA).
We now define strategies for each player p = E,A.
Definition 4. Fix any game G as above, a play β = 〈∗,m1,m2, . . .〉, a player p = E,A.
1. A strategy for p, or a p-strategy for short, is any tree σ , such that: (i) σ ⊆ T ; (ii) for all x ∈ σ such that turn(x) 6= p, each
x@〈m〉 ∈ T is in σ ; (iii) for all x ∈ σ such that turn(x) = p, at most one x@〈m〉 ∈ T is in σ .
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2. A p-strategy σ is well-defined on x ∈ T if either x 6∈ σ , or turn(x) 6= p, or x has exactly one child in σ . A p-strategy is
well-defined if it is well-defined on all x ∈ T .
3. p follows σ in β if either β ∈ σ , or β is infinite and all its prefixes are in σ .
4. A strategy is winning for p if pwins all maximal plays in which p follows σ .
If p follows awinning p-strategy, then pwins all plays. If a p-strategy iswell-defined, then p at leastwins all finitemaximal
plays β in which p follows σ . Proof : Assume by contradiction that x ∈ σ , x is a leaf of T , and p loses x. Then turn(x) = p
by definition of winner on x. Therefore, by x ∈ σ and definition of p-strategy, x has one child in σ ⊆ T , contradicting the
assumption that x is a leaf of T .
With each p-strategy σ we can associate a map φ : T → {∗} ∪M . If φ(x) = m ∈ M , we imagine that φ is suggesting to p
the movem from the position x. If φ(x) = ∗, we imagine that φ is suggesting no move to p from position x.
Definition 5. Let G be as above. Let σ be a p-strategy, and φ : T → {∗} ∪M any map.
1. We say that φ is associated with σ if for all x ∈ σ such that turn(x) = p, if x@〈φ(x)〉 ∈ T then x@〈φ(x)〉 is the unique
child of x in σ , while if x@〈φ(x)〉 6∈ T then x is a leaf in σ .
2. σ is recursive if someφ associatedwith σ is recursive. σ has recursive degreeO if someφ associatedwith σ has recursive
degree O.
In general, there is redundant information in a map φ : T → {∗} ∪ M associated with a p-strategy σ . All values of φ(x)
for x 6∈ σ , or turn(x) 6= p, are not determined by σ . If x ∈ σ and turn(x) = p, but x is a leaf in σ , then the only information
we have concerning φ(x) is that is not a legal move from x. Only in the case in which x ∈ σ , turn(x) = p and x has some
child y ∈ σ , we know that y is unique and φ(x) = y. Each map φ, instead, is associated with exactly one p-strategy σ .
Lemma 1. Let G be as above. Let φ : T → {∗}∪M be amap. Let σ = {x ∈ T |∀y ∈ T .(y < x∧turn(y) = p)⇒ y@〈φ(y)〉 ≤ x}
Then σ is a p-strategy, and is the unique p-strategy associated with φ.
Proof. By definition unfolding. 
The previous lemma states that we can define a strategy σ by defining any map φ : T → {∗} ∪ M , then taking the
associated strategy.
The example of gamewe have inmind are Tarski games for closed positive arithmetical formulas.We consider a language
L for first order Arithmetic, having one predicate symbol for each recursive predicate, one function symbol for each recursive
map, and the connectives ∨, ∃,∧,∀. Let L0 be the set of closed formulas of L. We define a notion of immediate subformula,
and an indexing for immediate subformula, for all A ∈ L0, as follows. If A = B1 ∨ · · · ∨ Bn, A = B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bn, the immediate
subformulas of A are B1, . . . , Bn. 1, . . . , n are the indexes of B1, . . . , Bn. If A = ∃x.B[x],∀x.B[x], the immediate subformulas
of A are all B[n] for n ∈ N . Each n is the index of B[n]. The subformula relation is the reflexive and transitive closure of the
immediate subformula relation. We define the subformula tree TA of A as the set of all lists x = 〈∗, n1, . . . , nk〉, such that
for some A0, . . . , Ak ∈ L0 we have A0 = A, and for all i = 1, . . . , k, Ai is the immediate subformula of Ai−1 of index ni.
A0, . . . , Ak ∈ L0 are uniquely determined from x. We say that x is a coding of the subformula Ak of A. The leaves of TA code
the atomic subformulas of A. The root 〈∗〉 of TA codes A itself.
We now formally define the Tarski game for A. In this game, E defends the truth of A, andA defends the falsity of A.
Definition 6. Fix any closed positive arithmetical formula A. Then the Tarski game G(A) = 〈∗,M, T ,WE ,WA〉 for A is
defined as follows:
1. M = N (the set of natural numbers), ∗ 6∈ N .
2. T = the subformula tree TA of A.
3. If x ∈ TA codes B, then we set: turn(x) = E if B is atomic false, or a disjunction, or an existential, and: turn(x) = A if B
is atomic true, or a conjunction, or a universal.
4. WE = WA = ∅ (T has no infinite branches).
The play runs as follows. The initial position 〈∗〉 codes A. Each position x codes some subformula B in A. A legal move from
x (if any) consists in selecting some i ∈ N , denoting the i-th subformula B′ of B. If B = C1 ∨ C2, or B = ∃x.C[x] then E moves,
selecting some i = 1, 2 in the first case, and some n ∈ N in the second case. Intuitively, E claims that Ci or C[n] are true. If
B = C1 ∧ C2, or B = ∀x.C[x] then A moves, selecting some i = 1, 2 in the first case, and some n ∈ N in the second case.
Intuitively,A claims Ci, C[n] are false. If B is atomic then x is a leaf of TA, and the play ends. If B is false then E loses, because
she should move, and she cannot. If B is true thenA loses, because he should move, and he cannot.
Lemma 2. E has a winning strategy on G(A) if and only if A is true, andA has a winning strategy on G(A) if and only if A is false.
Proof. We may define two canonical maps φ,ψ , with φ associated to a winning strategy σ for E when A is true, and with
ψ associated to a winning strategy τ forA if A is false. Assume x codes B. Then we set φ(x) equal to the index of some true
immediate subformula of B, if any, otherwise φ(x) = ∗. We setψ(x) equal to the index of some false immediate subformula
of B, if any, otherwiseψ(x) = ∗. Notice that, by case analysis, wemay check that ifAmoves from a true A, then all immediate
subformulas of A are true. If E moves from a true A, then some immediate subformula of A is true. Assume that A is true. By
induction over A, we deduce that in all plays following σ , all formulas are true. As a corollary, σ is always defined, and since
Tarski games are finite, σ is winning for E on G(A). Dually, if A is false, then τ is winning forA on G(A). 
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The maps φ,ψ above and the strategies σ , τ associated with them, are not recursive in general. We give an example
of a Tarski game with some winning strategy for E , but no recursive winning strategy. Assume that P(x, y) is a recursive
predicate, and ∀y.P(x, y) is a non-recursive predicate. For instance, P(x, y) could state that x codes some integer pair 〈a, b〉,
and that the a-th partial recursive map (in some fixed enumeration) applied to b does not converge in y steps or less.
Then ∀y.P(x, y) formalizes the Halting problem, a non-recursive statement. Denote with P⊥ the complement of P . Let
EM1 = ∀x.(∀y.P(x, y) ∨ ∃y.P⊥(x, y)). EM1 is equivalent, using intuitionistic reasoning, to Excluded Middle for ∃y.P⊥(x, y).
Let G be the Tarski game G(EM1) associated with EM1. We will now describe G.
The tree T of positions of G is the subformula tree of EM1. G runs as follows. First, A moves n. The next position, 〈∗, n〉,
codes ∀y.P(n, y) ∨ ∃y.P⊥(n, y). Intuitively, this is an instance of EM1 which A believes to be false. Then E moves either
i = 1 or i = 2. The next position, 〈∗, n, i〉, codes either ∀y.P(n, y) or ∃y.P⊥(n, y). Intuitively, this is the component of the
disjunction E believes to be true.
In the first subcase, A moves m ∈ N . The next position, 〈∗, n, 1,m〉, codes P(n,m), some instance of ∀y.P(n, y) that A
believes to be false. This position is a leaf. The play ends and E wins if and only if P(n,m) is true.
In the second subcase, E moves m ∈ N . The next position, 〈∗, n, 2,m〉, codes P⊥(n,m) (notice that there are two
consecutive moves by E in this case). This position is a leaf. The play ends, and E wins if and only if P⊥(n,m) is true.
A map φ, associated with any winning strategy for E on G, must select, from position 〈∗, n〉, the move 1 if P(n, y) is true
for all y. If P(n,m) is false (and P⊥(n,m) is true) for some m, then φ must select the move 2, then from position 〈∗, n, 2〉
some m such that P⊥(n,m) is true. Therefore, if φ associated with a winning strategy for E on G, then φ(〈∗, n〉) = 1 if and
only if ∀y.P(x, y) is true. ∀y.P(x, y) is not recursive, therefore φ is not recursive. By Definition 5, this means that there is no
recursive winning E-strategy. In Section 3, instead, we will introduce a version of G(EM1) with 1-backtracking, in which E
has some recursive winning strategy.
3. Games with 1-backtracking
In this section we define, for all games G (in the sense of Section 2), a game bck(G) with ‘‘1-backtracking’’. We make
precise the informal definition sketched in Section 1. Then we discuss the definition and we introduce one example. More
examples can be found in Section 4.
For finite lists x, y, we say that x is a one-step extension of y if x = y@〈m〉 for some m. If β = x0, x1, x2, . . . is any
sequence of non-empty lists, by last(β)we denote the sequencem0 = ∗,m1,m2, . . ., where eachmi is the last element of
the non-empty list xi.
Definition 7. Let G = (∗,M, T , turn,WE ,WA) be a game. Then the 1-backtracking game associated with G is bck(G) =
(∗′,M ′, T ′, turn′,W ′E ,W ′A), where:
1. ∗′ = 〈∗〉,M ′ = T .
2. T ′ is the set of finite sequences β = x0, x1, . . . , xn overM ′ (i.e., over T ), such that:
- x0 = 〈∗〉;
- any xi+1 is a one-step extension of some xj such that: (i) 0 ≤ j ≤ i; (ii) xj ≤ xi; (iii) turn(xj) = turn(xi).
3. turn′(〈x0, . . . , xi〉) = turn(xi).
4. (1-limits). If β = x0, x1, x2, . . . is any branch of T ′, the 1-limit of β is the sequence β(1) = xn0 , xn1 , xn2 , . . ., inductively
defined as follows.
- n0 = 0
- If nk is any index of β(1), and there is a last j > nk such that xj is a child of xnk , then nk+1 = j. Otherwise, nk is the last
index of β(1).
5. W ′p = {β|(β is an infinite branch of T ) ∧ (pwins last(β(1)) in G)}.
If G is a game in the sense of Section 2, then also bck(G) is. Therefore we can iterate bck(.), and define
bck(bck(G)), . . . , bckn(G). We now discuss the definition of bck(G).
We first discuss the notion of play with 1-backtracking, that is, of branch of T ′ (see Definition 7.2). A play with
1-backtracking runs like an ordinary play, except that any player may use the experience he gathered from some wrong
move, in order to modify finitely many times some previous move. More in detail, let us assume that the previous moves of
the play are x0 = 〈m0〉, x1 = 〈m0,m1〉, . . . , xi = 〈m0, . . . ,mi〉. Assume p (either E orA) is the player moving from position
〈x0, . . . , xi〉. Then p can play 〈m0, . . . ,mi,m〉, for some legalmovem from xi. However, p can also backtrack to some previous
move xj, provided that: (i) j < i; (ii) the list xj is some prefix of the list xi (that is, xj is an ancestor of xi in the tree of positions
of G); (iii) pmoved from xj. Then p can play xi+1 = 〈m0, . . . ,mj,m〉 for some legal movem from xj.
We present a short example, showing the possibilities and the limitations of 1-backtracking. Assume that β = 〈m0,
m1,m2,m3〉 is some position of a game G. Assume E moves when the last index is even, andA when the last index is odd.
The last index of β is 3, thereforeAmoves next. Rather than moving 〈m0,m1,m2,m3,m4〉, he can backtrack, for instance,
to 〈m0,m1〉. ThenA can play 〈m0,m1,m′2〉. E moves next. E may retract a previous move, and backtrack to 〈m0〉. However,
by Definition 7.2, E cannot backtrack to 〈m0,m1,m2〉, since this position is not a prefix of the current position. The first
backtracking, byA, removes forever, and for both players, the possibility of backtracking to 〈m0,m1,m2〉.
We introduce the notion of backtracking-free plays of bck(G) and we define a copy Gbck-f of the game G inside G.
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Definition 8. Let β = 〈x0, x1, x2, . . .〉 be a play of bck(G).
1. xi+1 is backtracking-free, or bck.-free short, if it is a one-step extension of xi. xi+1 is a 1-backtrackingmove if it is a one-step
extension of some xj < xi with j < i. In this case we say that p backtracks to xj, then moves xi+1.
2. We say that β is bck.-free, if all moves in β are bck.-free. T ′bck-f is the tree of all finite bck.-free plays of bck(G). Ibck-f is
the set of all infinite bck.-free plays of bck(G).
3. We call the game Gbck-f = (∗′,M ′, T ′bck-f , turn′,W ′E ∩ Ibck-f ,W ′A ∩ Ibck-f ) the bck.-free part of bck(G).
A play β of bck(G) is bck.-free if all xi+1 in β are one-step extensions of xi. Thus, β is bck.-free if and only if β is
〈〈∗〉, 〈∗,m1〉, 〈∗,m1,m2〉, 〈∗,m1,m2,m3〉, . . .〉, for somem1,m2,m3, . . .. Bck.-free positions form a tree Tbck-f included in
the tree of positions of bck(G), and which is tree-isomorphic to the tree T of positions of G. The isomorphism pair between
Tbck-f , T is last, prefs, with prefs(x) equal to the list 〈x0, . . . , xn〉 of prefixes of x, in increasing order. If β is bck.-free
then β(1) = β because for any move xi in β , but the last one, the only move replying to xi in β is xi+1. Thus, the winning
condition for player p in an infinite play β in Gbck-f is equivalent to last(β) ∈ Wp. We conclude that the backtracking-free
game Gbck-f is, up to an application of the map last, identical to the game G.
We now discuss the notions of 1-limit and winner for an infinite play. Let β = 〈x0, x1, x2, . . .〉 be any finite or infinite
branch of bck(G), and p the player moving from x0 = 〈∗〉. First p moves m ∈ M . Later, p can retract his move, by moving
m′ ∈ M from x0. Still later, p can retract his move again, by moving m′′ from x0, and so forth. However, p can only change
his move finitely many times, otherwise he loses. If there is no last move from x0, it is as if there is no move at all from x0:
p loses, because he changed his mind infinitely many times. If we start from the root of the game and we always take the
last move from a given position (when it exists), then we remove 1-backtracking from β , defining some bck.-free play β(1)
which we call the 1-limit of β (see Definition 7.4).
β(1) is not computable in general, even when β is computable. Intuitively, β(1) includes all definitive choices of both
players in β , whenever a definitive choice exists. We have β(1) = β if and only if β is bck.-free. β(1) is some branch of
Tbck-f , therefore last(β(1)) is some branch of T , i.e., some play of G. In Definition 7.5, the winner of an infinite branch β
of bck(G) is defined as the winner of last(β(1)) in G. In general, we cannot decide the winner of an infinite play, not even
when the play is recursive. The loser of a finite play β is, by the general definition of game (Section 2, [10]), p = turn′(β),
the first player who should move and does not.
We include an example of bck(G), whenG is the Tarski game for EM1 (see Section 2). Themoves of bck(G) are all positions
ofG(EM1), that is: 〈∗〉, coding EM1 itself; all lists 〈∗, n〉, coding ∀y.P(n, y)∨∃y.P⊥(n, y); all lists 〈∗, n, 1〉 and 〈∗, n, 2〉, coding:
∀y.P(n, y) and ∃y.P⊥(n, y); all lists 〈∗, n, 1,m〉 and 〈∗, n, 2,m〉, coding: P(n,m) and P⊥(n,m). Following are some examples
of legal lists of moves of bck(G). The sequence of subformulas ∀y.P(n, y)∨ ∃y.P⊥(n, y),∀y.P(n, y), P(n,m) corresponds to
a play both in G and in bck(G). The list representing the play in G is 〈∗, n, 1,m〉. The list representing the play in bck(G) is
more involved: it is 〈〈∗〉, 〈∗, n〉, 〈∗, n, 1〉, 〈∗, n, 1,m〉〉, a bck.-free play of bck(G). The difference between bck(G) and G is
that if P(n,m) is false, then in bck(G) E does not necessarily lose, but she can play, say, 〈∗, n, 2〉, coding ∃y.P⊥(n, y). This
is a legal move because E backtracks to the prefix 〈∗, n〉 (coding ∀y.P(n, y)∨ ∃y.P⊥(n, y)) of the last move 〈∗, n, 1,m〉, and
change her previous move 〈∗, n, 1〉 (coding ∀y.P(n, y)) to 〈∗, n, 2〉 (coding ∃y.P⊥(n, y)). The resulting position in bck(G) is
〈〈∗〉, 〈∗, n〉, 〈∗, n, 1〉, 〈∗, n, 1,m〉, 〈∗, n, 2〉〉.
E has a recursive winning strategy in bck(G). In order to make the definition of the winning strategy simpler, we first
consider the sub-game bckcf(G) of bck(G), in which A does not backtrack. bckcf(G) is defined by taking the subset of
positions of bck(G) in which all moves of A are backtracking-free. We call bckcf(G) the cut-free sub-game of bck(G).
bckcf(G) is a game biased in favor of E : she can change finitely many times a move in order to make it better, whileAmust
choose the right move in the first try. We can imagine E as a beginner and A an expert. The bias in favor of E is a way to
allow her to learn how to play better (this trick is indeed used by an expert to teach Chess to a beginner).
Surprisingly, once E learns how to win in bckcf(G), she also wins in the more involved game bck(G). This result was
proved in [4,5]. It has some analogy with the fact that, in Hyland–Ong’s gamemodel of PCF, we can restrict ourselves to play
‘‘innocently’’ [9].
Lemma 3. Every winning strategy τ of E on bckcf(G)may be effectively extended to some winning strategy τ ′ for E on bck(G).
τ ′ is recursive if both τ and the tree of positions of G are recursive.
For a proof of Lemma 3 we refer to [4]. We informally describe how to extend a strategy for E from bckcf(G) to bck(G).
In any position, E defines a simplified position by skipping all replies of A to her moves but the last one. In this way she
transforms a position including backtracking moves by A into one in which there are no backtracking moves by A. Then
she can apply her strategy on bckcf(G) in order to choose her next move. We claim that in this way a winning strategy on
bckcf(G) is turned into a winning strategy on bck(G), and this latter is recursive when the former is.
We now define a recursive winning strategy τ for E and prove that τ is winning, in the simplified case in whichA does
not backtrack. By Lemma 3, we will conclude that we can effectively extend τ to some recursive winning strategy for E .
We present the definition of some recursive map ψ : T ′ → {∗′} ∪ M ′ associated with τ . Three dots . . . will denote any
list of arguments. AssumeAmoves 〈∗, n〉, coding ∀y.P(n, y)∨∃y.P⊥(n, y). E first assumes that ∀y.P(n, y) is true andmoves
〈∗, n, 1〉: we define ψ(〈. . . , 〈∗, n〉〉) = 〈∗, n, 1〉 for all n ∈ N . A moves 〈∗, n, 1,m〉, for some m: this move codes P(n,m).
If P(n,m) is true, thenA loses. If P(n,m) is false, then E changes her mind (just once!) and she assumes that ∃y.P⊥(n, y) is
false. She comes back to 〈∗, n〉, which is an ancestor of 〈∗, n, 1,m〉 in the tree structure of G. Then E moves 〈∗, n, 2〉. This is a
1260 S. Berardi et al. / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 161 (2010) 1254–1269
1-backtracking move, coding ∃y.P⊥(n, y). We therefore define ψ(〈. . . , 〈∗, n, 1,m〉〉) = 〈∗, n, 2〉, for all n,m ∈ N .
Eventually, E moves 〈∗, n, 2,m〉, coding P⊥(n,m), by assumption a true formula, and she wins. We express this last choice
by defining ψ(〈. . . , 〈. . . ,m〉, 〈∗, n, 2〉〉) = 〈∗, n, 2,m〉, for all n,m ∈ N . In any other case, we define ψ(β) = ∗′ = 〈∗〉.
We could say that E , during the play, does not know for sure the truth value of ∀y.P(n, y). Rather, she ‘‘learns’’ this truth
value by trial-and-error. In Section 4 we include more examples of bck(G). In Sections 6–8 we prove the results we claimed
in Section 1.
4. Some examples of 1-backtracking
In this section we include some examples of games with 1-backtracking. In all examples we consider, E has some
recursive winning strategy on bck(G), but no recursive winning strategy on G. This supports our thesis that strategies for
bck(G) are ‘‘more concrete’’ than strategies for G. We choose games interpreting well-known mathematical statements.
4.1. Minimum principle for recursive functions
Fix any unary map g : N → N . The minimum value of g is the minimum of the set {g(n)|n ∈ N}. y ∈ N is a minimum
point of g if g(y) is a minimum value of g . All maps g : N → N have a (unique) minimum value and some minimum point.
The proof is by contradiction: if it were ∀y.∃z.g(y) > g(z), then, starting from y0 = 0, we could define an infinite decreasing
chain g(y0) > g(y1) > g(y2) > · · · in N , contradiction. Assume f : N,N → N is any binary map on N . Define a family
{fx}x∈N of unarymaps onN by fx(y) = f (x, y), for all x, y ∈ N . Theminimumprinciple for f states that all fx’s have aminimum
point. We may express the minimum principle for f by the (true) formulaMf = ∀x.∃y.∀z.fx(y) ≤ fx(z).
Let Gf be the Tarski game forMf : we call Gf the ‘‘Minimum game’’. The Minimum game Gf runs as follows. FirstAmoves
some x ∈ N . The next position, 〈∗, x〉, codes some instance ∃y.∀z.fx(y) ≤ fx(z) ofM , thatA believes to be false. Then E moves
some y ∈ N . The next position, 〈∗, x, y〉, codes some instance ∀z.fx(y) ≤ fx(z) that E believes to be true, corresponding to
some y that E believes is aminimumpoint of fx. Eventually,A tests this belief bymoving z ∈ N . The next position, 〈∗, x, y, z〉,
codes some atomic formula fx(y) ≤ fx(z). If fx(y) ≤ fx(z) is true, then E wins, otherwiseA wins. Any strategy τ for E on Gf
is associated with some map ψ on the positions of the game. Let yx = ψ(〈∗, x〉), with yx undefined if ψ(〈∗, x〉) = ∗′. The
partial map x 7→ yx takes any x ∈ N , and returns (when defined) some yx ∈ N , which E asserts to be a minimum point of fx.
By definition unfolding, τ is a winning strategy for E on Gf if and only if yx is always defined and is always a minimum point
of fx. Since Mf is true, there are winning strategies for E on Gf . However, E has no recursive winning strategy in general,
unless we allow backtracking.
Lemma 4 (The Minimum Game). Let Gf be the Minimum game for f : N,N → N.
1. For some total recursive binary f , there is no recursive winning strategy for E on Gf .
2. For all total recursive binary f , there is some recursive winning strategy τ for E on bck(Gf ).
Proof. 1. Let EM1 = ∀x.(∀y.P(x, y) ∨ ∃y.P⊥(x, y)), for ∀y.P(x, y) some non-recursive predicate, as in Section 2. Define
fx(y) = 1 if P(x, y) is true, and fx(y) = 0 if P(x, y) is false. Assume by contradiction that E has a recursive winning
strategy τ for the Minimum Principle for {fx}x∈N . Then some associated map ψ is recursive because τ is recursive, and
yx = ψ(〈∗, x〉) is a total map because τ is winning. Therefore we can compute one minimum point yx and the minimum
value fx(yx) of fx, given x. fx has minimum value 1 if and only if fx(y) = 1 for all y ∈ N , and by definition unfolding, if and
only if ∀y.P(x, y) is true. Therefore we can compute the truth value of ∀y.P(x, y), which is a contradiction.
2. As we did in Section 2, we define a recursive map ψ associated with τ , then we prove that τ is winning under the
assumption thatA does not backtrack. By Lemma 3, wewill conclude that τ may be extended to some recursive winning
strategy for E on all plays of bck(Gf ). We present the definition of ψ . Three dots . . .will denote any list. A first moves
any 〈∗, a〉, that is, he selects some instance ∃y.∀z.fa(y) ≤ fa(z) he believes to be false. Then E moves 〈∗, a, b0〉, with
b0 = 0, coding some instance ∀z.fa(b0) ≤ fa(z) that E believes to be true. We express this first choice by defining
ψ(〈. . . , 〈∗, a〉〉) = 〈∗, a, 0〉.
A moves 〈∗, a, b0, b1〉, selecting some fa(b0) ≤ fa(b1) he believes to be false. If fa(b0) ≤ fa(b1) is true, E wins.
Otherwise, we know that fa(b0) > fa(b1). Then E comes back to 〈∗, a〉 (coding ∃y.∀z.fa(y) ≤ fa(z)), an ancestor of
〈∗, a, b0, b1〉 in Gf ), and she moves 〈∗, a, b1〉, coding ∀z.fa(b1) ≤ fa(z). E continues in this way. At each step, either E
wins, or she does not. If E does not win, then E backtracks to 〈∗, a〉 and moves 〈∗, a, bi+1〉, if 〈∗, a, bi, bi+1〉 was the last
move by A. We express all these choices by defining ψ(〈. . . , 〈∗, a, b, b′〉, 〉) = 〈∗, a, b′〉. In any other case, we define
ψ(β) = ∗′.
E defines, as long as she does not win, some sequence b0, b1, b2, . . . such that fa(b0) > fa(b1) > fa(b2) > · · ·. This
sequence stops in at most fa(b0)+ 1 steps. The only way this sequence can stop is that E wins. 
We claim that this recursive winning strategy may be considered as an algorithm ‘‘learning by trial-and-error’’ some
minimum point of fa. At first sight, when the strategy stops, it only provides some bi such that fa(bi) ≤ fa(bi+1), not some
bi such that ∀z.fa(bi) ≤ fa(z). However, this strategy is winning not just in bckcf(Gf ), but also in bck(Gf ). In this latter
play, A can change any number of times his move 〈∗, a, bi, bi+1〉, choosing in this order bi+1, b′i+1, b′′i+1, b′′′i+1, . . .. In this
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case, E will, in finite time, select some i such that fa(bi) ≤ fa(bi+1), fa(b′i+1), fa(b′′i+1), fa(b′′′i+1), . . ., for all bi+1, b′i+1, b′′i+1, . . .
selected by A. The main difference with a map selecting a minimum point is that, in the case A provides infinitely many
bi+1, b′i+1, b
′′
i+1, . . ., we never know for sure when E changes her mind for the last time. We only know that there is, indeed,
a last choice of bi. Suppose, instead, that the ‘‘test set’’ provided byA for eachwould-beminimum point of fa is always finite.
In this case we can think of the strategy as an algorithm finding an ‘‘empirical’’ value for the minimum of fa, depending on
some assignment of one finite ‘‘test set’’ to each bi. This ‘‘empirical’’ minimum point is sometimes different from the real
minimumpoint. However, inmany relevant applications of Classical Arithmetic we do not need to compute a real minimum
point, but only to compute such an ‘‘empirical’’ minimum point.
4.2. Subsequence principle for recursive functions
We present another example of game Gf , such that E has a recursive winning strategy for bck(Gf ), but no recursive
winning strategy for Gf .
Gf is a game corresponding to a combinatorial principle which we call the Subsequence Principle.
Lemma 5 (Subsequence Principle). For all maps g : N → N there is some increasing sequence x1 < x2 < x3 < · · · such that
g(x1) ≤ g(x2) ≤ g(x3) ≤ · · ·.
Proof. We first Claim that for all x ∈ N there is some y ≥ x such that g(y) ≤ g(z) for all z ≥ y.
Proof of the Claim.We apply the Minimum Principle of Section 4.1 to the map t 7→ g(x+ t).
Now we define {xk}k>0 by recursion over k, using the Claim. We set x1 equal to some y ≥ 0 such that g(y) ≤ g(z) for all
z ≥ y. For all k > 0, we set xk+1 equal to some y ≥ xk + 1 such that g(y) ≤ g(z) for all z ≥ y. By definition of {xk}k>0 we
have x1 < x2 < x3 < · · ·. By definition of {xk}k>0 again we deduce g(x1) ≤ g(y) for all y ≥ x1, and g(xk+1) ≤ g(y) for all
k > 0 and all y ≥ xk+1. We conclude that g(x1) ≤ g(x2) ≤ g(x3) ≤ · · ·. 
Fix any binary map f : N,N → N on N . We define a family {fn}n∈N of total unary maps on N by fx(y) = f (x, y) for all
x, y ∈ N . We define the Subsequence principle for f with the statement: ∀n.∃x1 < x2 < x3 < · · · (fn(x1) ≤ fn(x2) ≤ fn(x3) ≤
· · ·), having infinitely many quantifiers. We use S to denote this formula. Even if S is an infinite expression, not belonging to
our language, we can associate with S a game Gf which we call ‘‘the Subsequence game’’.
The Subsequence game Gf is almost a ‘‘solitaire’’ game: apart from the first move n ∈ N by A, all moves are by E . The
tree T of positions of Gf consists of all finite lists 〈∗, n, x1, . . . , xk〉, such that x1 < · · · < xk and fn(x1) ≤ · · · ≤ fn(xk). The
starting position is 〈∗〉. E wins only all infinite plays. A wins in all leaves of T (i.e., in all 〈∗, n, x1, . . . , xk〉 ∈ T such that
fn(xk) > fn(x) for all x > xk).
There is a winning strategy for E on Gf , defining for each first move n ∈ N ofA an infinite branch of T , corresponding to
some infinite increasing sequence x1 < x2 < x3 < · · · such that fn(x1) ≤ fn(x2) ≤ fn(x3) ≤ · · ·. Instead, E has a recursive
winning strategy on Gf only if we allow backtracking.
Lemma 6 (The Subsequence Game). Let f : N,N → N be a binary map, and Gf be the Subsequence game for f .
1. For some total recursive f , there is no recursive winning strategy for E on Gf .
2. For all total recursive f , there is some recursive winning strategy τ for E on bck(Gf ).
Proof. 1. Assume that P(x, y) is a recursive predicate, and ∀y.P(x, y) is a non-recursive predicate. Define fx(y) = 1 if
P(x, 0) ∧ · · · ∧ P(x, y), and fx(y) = 0 otherwise. Then all fx are weakly decreasing. If x1 < x2 < x3 < · · · is any
infinite sequence such that fx(x1) ≤ fx(x2) ≤ fx(x3) ≤ · · ·, then fx(x1) = fx(x2) = fx(x3) = · · ·. If fx(x1) = 1, then P(x, y)
is true for all y, and if fx(x1) = 0, then P(x, y) is false for some y. Assume there is a recursive map ψ : M → T associated
with a winning strategy for E . Then x1 = ψ(〈∗, x〉) is the first element of the infinite subsequence, and by computing
fx(x1)we compute the truth value of ∀y.P(x, y), which leads to a contradiction.
2. As usual, we define some associated map ψ . Consider any 〈∗, n, x1, . . . , xk〉 ∈ T , for any k ∈ N . Set x = 0 if k = 0,
and x = xk + 1 otherwise. Then E moves 〈∗, n, x1, . . . , xi, x〉, for the last 1 ≤ i ≤ k such that fn(xi) ≤ fn(x) (E moves
〈∗, n, x〉 if there is no such i). We define ψ(〈. . . , 〈∗, n, x1, . . . , xk〉〉) = 〈∗, n, x1, . . . , xi, x〉. We have x1 < · · · < xi < x
by xi ≤ xk < x, and fn(x1) ≤ · · · ≤ fn(xi) ≤ fn(x) by the choice of x. In the case in which i < k, by definition we have
fn(xk) > fn(x), and the move requires 1-backtracking: 〈∗, n, x1, . . . , xi〉 is a proper ancestor of 〈∗, n, x1, . . . , xk〉 in T . Let
β be the infinite list of nodes of T recursively defined by the strategy τ .
We Claim: for all xi in β(1), xi has at least the child xi+1, and xi has finitely many children in β .
Proof of the Claim. If xi+1 were the child of xj for some j < i, then xi+1 and not xj+1 would be the last child of xj in β , contra-
dicting the definition of β(1). Assume that E plays 〈∗, n, x1, . . . , xi+1〉, 〈∗, n, x1, . . . , xi, x′i+1〉, 〈∗, n, x1, . . . , xi, x′′i+1〉, . . .
from 〈∗, x1, . . . , xi〉. All moves xi+1, x′i+1, x′′i+1, . . . but the first one require 1-backtracking, therefore we have fn(xi+1) >
fn(x′i+1) > fn(x
′′
i+1) > · · ·. Thus, E can backtrack at most fn(xi+1) times to 〈∗, n, x1, . . . , xi〉.
By the Claim and by definition of β(1), we deduce that β(1) is infinite. Thus, last(β(1)) is infinite. E wins last(β(1)),
because E wins all infinite plays in Gf . By definition, E wins β in bck(Gf ). 
1262 S. Berardi et al. / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 161 (2010) 1254–1269
The recursive winning strategy defined in the previous Lemma may be considered an algorithm which ‘‘learns by trial-
and-error’’ some infinite sequence as required. Indeed, E eventually produces some last choice for x1, then some last choice
for x2, and so forth. Notice that this algorithm is not an algorithm returning an infinite branch 〈∗, x1, x2, x3, . . .〉 in T . In
general, we cannot decide whether a given choice of E for x1 is the last choice, or not. The same holds for the choices of
x2, x3, . . ..
5. Liveness and 1-backtracking
In this section we introduce Liveness, a property of games, generalizing the fact that players alternate in the game. We
need Liveness in the formal statement of Theorem 2, at the end of Section 7.
Fix any infinite play β of bck(G). Assume that a player p moves only finitely many times in β . In particular, after some
point p cannot subsequently retract a move in the case in which he discovers he was wrong. Backtracking is eventually
forbidden to p. This is a serious handicap for p. In this case, Theorem 2 may fail, because p can have a winning strategy of
degree 1 in G, but no recursive winning strategy in bck(G). An example. Consider again the Tarski game G for EM1. Define
the following variant G′ of G. G′ is obtained by replacing each leaf of the tree of G in which E loses by one infinite branch,
consisting of infinitely many dummy moves ofA. E loses all infinite plays of G′. We may easily prove that E has a winning
strategy of degree 1 in G′. This strategy is essentially the same strategy that E has in G. However, E has no recursive winning
strategy in bck(G′), becauseAmay prevent her from backtracking just by playing dummy moves forever, and in this case
Awins.
In order to prevent the failure of Theorem 2, we grant some advantage to a player p in this unfavorable case. We add, in
the statement of Theorem 2, the ‘‘Liveness’’ condition on G and p:
Definition 9 (Liveness). A game G satisfies Liveness for p if: ‘‘for all infinite plays β of G, if p moves only finitely many times in
β , then p wins β ’’.
We may reformulate Liveness for G and p as follows: ‘‘if the player p performs infinitely many consecutive moves in a play
β of G, then p loses in β ’’.
If players alternate in G, or if all plays of G are finite (as in Tarski games), then no player performs infinitely many
consecutive moves in G. In this case, both players trivially satisfy Liveness. If G is Tarski game for EM1 (Section 2), then,
indeed, both players can perform infinitelymany consecutivemoves in bck(G), by backtracking always to the same position
of G. However, in such a case they lose, as the Liveness condition requires. The same holds if G is the game of Section 4.1.
If G is the game of Section 4.2, then E trivially satisfies Liveness, because all moves are by E . However, A trivially does
not satisfy Liveness in such a G: A never moves, yet he always loses any infinite play. Liveness is preserved while forming
Gbck-f, bck(G):
Lemma 7. If p satisfies Liveness in G, then p satisfies Liveness in Gbck-f and in bck(G).
Proof. p satisfies Liveness in Gbck-f because Gbck-f is the isomorphic copy of G in bck(G). Assume p moves finitely many
times in an infinite play β of bck(G). We will prove that pwins β(1), hence last(β(1)) in G, and β in bck(G). We reason by
cases over β(1). Assume β(1) is finite, with last position xni . Since β is infinite, xni has infinitely many children in β . Since p
moves finitely many times, the player moving from xni is his opponent, q. Thus, q loses β
(1) because q is the last player to
move. Assume, instead, that β(1) is infinite. Since β(1) is a subsequence of β , then pmoves only finitely many times in β(1),
and β(1) is bck.-free. By the Liveness assumption on Gbck-f , pwins β(1). 
We now characterize the elements of a 1-limit play β(1) (this is an essential ingredient for the results of our paper).
Lemma 8. Fix a game G = (∗,M, T , turn,WE ,WA). Let p be a player, and β = 〈x0, . . . , xn, . . .〉 a play with 1-backtracking.
Assume n0, n1, n2, . . . is the sequence of indexes of β(1) (Definition 7.4). Then:
1. For all ni, x(ni+1) (if it exists) is a child of xni .
2. Assume that β has a last element xm. Then β(1) has last index m, last element xm, and β(1) is the list of ancestors of xm.
3. For all n > 0, xn is either a child of xn−1, or the brother of xi, for some i < n.
Proof. 1. By definition of 1-backtracking, xni+1 is a child of xnj for some j ≤ i. We cannot have j < i, otherwise xni+1 would
be a child of xnj in β after xnj+1 , contradicting the choice of xnj+1 as the last child of xnj . Then xni+1 is a child of xni .
2. Let ni be the last index of β(1). We will prove that ni = m. It will follow that β(1) is the list of ancestors of xm. By
contradiction, assume that ni < m. By point 1, xni has some child xni+1 after ni in β , and therefore some last child xni+1
after ni. Thus, xni is not the last element of β
(1), which is a contradiction.
3. Let (〈x0, . . . , xn〉)(1) = 〈xn0 , . . . , xnk〉. Then nk = n by the previous point, and therefore n = nk ≥ nk−1+1. If n = nk−1+1,
then xn is a child of xn−1 = xnk−1 . If n > nk−1+ 1, then xn and (by point 1) xnk−1+1 are children of xnk−1 , therefore they are
brothers. 
Twomore ingredients for the results of our paper are the following: the definition of non-trivial move in bck(G), and the
relationship between a well-defined strategy in G and a non-trivial move in bck(G).
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Definition 10 (Non-trivial Moves). Let G be any game, β = 〈x0, . . . , xn〉 any position in bck(G), and x any move from β in
bck(G).
1. x is non-trivial if: either x is a child of xn, or x 6= xi, for the last i ≤ n such that x is a brother of xi.
2. x is trivial in the opposite case.
We perform a trivial move if we backtrack to some previous position, then we repeat the last move we did from this
position. In the definition of non-trivial moves, we implicitly used the fact that for all moves xn+1 = x from a position
〈x0, . . . , xn〉 in bck(G), either xn+1 is a child of xn, or xn+1 has some brother xi with i ≤ n. A well-defined strategy on G can
be used to produce non-trivial moves in bck(G).
Lemma 9. Let G be a game, σ a p-strategy over G, with associated map φ, and β = 〈x0, . . . , xm〉 be a position of bck(G). Assume
σ is well-defined over all y ≤ xm, and turn(xm) = p. Then for some i ≤ mwe have: xi ≤ xm, turn(xi) = p, and x = xi@〈φ(xi)〉
is a non-trivial move from β in bck(G).
Proof. We reason by cases.
Assume xm ∈ σ . Then, since turn(xm) = p and σ is well-defined over xm, there is a unique child z of xm in σ . We have
z = xm@〈φ(xm)〉, because φ is a map associated with σ , and xm@〈φ(xm)〉 is a non-trivial move from β in bck(G).
Now assume xm 6∈ σ . By Lemma 8.2, β(1) = 〈xn0 , . . . , xnk〉 is the list of ancestors of xm = xnk . Take the last i ≤ k
such that xni ∈ σ . By the definition of p-strategy, we have that xn0 is the root of σ . Therefore i exists and i < k, because
xm = xnk 6∈ σ . Again by definition of p-strategy, if turn(xni) 6= p, then from xni ∈ σ and the fact that xni+1 is a child of
xni we deduce xni+1 ∈ σ . This contradicts the choice of i. Thus, turn(xni) = p. σ is well-defined over xni by assumption.
We deduce that x = xni@〈φ(xni)〉 exists, and it is the unique child of xni in σ . Again by the choice of i we have xni+1 6∈ σ ,
hence xni@〈φ(xni)〉 6= xni+1 . xni+1 is the last child of xni in β , and therefore is the last brother of xni@〈φ(xni)〉 in β . Thus,
x = xni@〈φ(xni)〉 is a non-trivial move from β in bck(G). 
6. Removing 1-backtracking from strategies
In this sectionweprove that anywinning strategy of degreeO forbck(G)maybe transformed into somewinning strategy
of degreeO′ forG. This result does not require the Liveness hypothesis onG. In Section 7we prove the converse. The converse
requires the Liveness hypothesis on G.
We recall what is a recursive degree (for more details we refer to [11]). We say that a map f is Turing-reducible to a map
g and we write f ≤ g if we may compute f recursively in an oracle for the map g . ≤ is a preorder. We say that two maps f
and g are Turing equivalent, and we write f ≡ g , if f ≤ g and g ≤ f . A recursive degree O is any equivalence class of the
relation≡. We order Turing degreeO1,O2 byO1 ≤ O2 if and only if f ≤ g for any f ∈ O1, g ∈ O2. Semi-decidable problems
in O are statements of the form ∃y.(f (x, y) = 1), for some binary map f ∈ O. An oracle for ∃y.(f (x, y) = 1) is some unary
map g such that g(x) = 1 if and only if ∃y.(f (x, y) = 1). The ‘‘jump’’ O′ of O is the highest recursive degree of an oracle for
semi-decidable problems in O′: for instance, 1 = 0′ is the recursive degree of an oracle for the Halting problem.
Fix any recursive degree O, and any game G = (M, T , turn,WE ,WA) such that M, T , turn ∈ O. Let p be any player,
and q his opponent. Let O′ be the jump of O. Assume τ of degree O is some winning strategy for p on bck(G). Our thesis is
that there is a winning strategy σ of degreeO′ for p on G. G and Gbck-f (the set of backtracking-free positions of bck(G)) are
clearly isomorphic. Therefore it is enough to define a winning strategy σ ∈ O′ for p in Gbck-f.
By definition unfolding, if p wins β in bck(G), then p wins β(1) in Gbck-f. Our idea, therefore, is to define two plays in
parallel, β(1) in Gbck-f and β in bck(G), such that p follows σ in β(1), and follows τ in β . p eventually wins β , hence p will
win β(1). If p moves from β(1), and therefore from β , we have to define the move φ(β(1)), and a map φ associated with σ .
Our goal is to obtain some γ > β in bck(G), in which p still follows τ , and such that γ (1) = β(1)@〈x〉. Then we will set
φ(β(1)) = x.
Let β = 〈x0, . . . , xn〉. A problem is that, for all γ > β , the strategy τ could backtrack to some proper prefix xi of xn before
moving. In other words, for all γ > β we could have γ (1) = 〈x0, . . . , xi, x〉 for some i < k. In this case, x is not a child of xn. In
order to avoid this, we will consider a subset of positions β = 〈x0, . . . , xn〉 of bck(G)which we call stable, such that τ never
backtracks to some proper prefix of xn, for any γ > β . In other words, we ask that, if p follows τ , then p never changes his
mind about some move in β . Being stable is negatively decidable in O, therefore decidable in O′. Whenever pmoves from
β , we will search (using blind search and a test for stability inO′), for some stable γ > β such that γ (1) = β(1)@〈x〉. It is not
evident that such a γ exists. If γ exists, we will set φ(β(1)) = x. We call such a γ a stable successor of β . As we shall see, if
turn(β) = p and β is stable then, indeed, β has some stable successor γ .
In order to define ‘‘stable’’ plays in bck(G), we will consider plays in which q does not backtrack.
Definition 11. Let G = (M, T , turn,WE ,WA) be any game, and p be any player, and q his opponent. Assume τ is any
p-strategy.
1. A play is q-cut-free if q never backtracks (i.e., for all indexes i > 0 of α, if turn(xi−1) = q then xi is a child of xi−1).
2. We denote by U(p, τ ) the tree of all finite q-cut-free plays α = 〈x0, . . . , xn〉 of bck(G), on which p follows τ .
3. α ∈ U(p, τ ) is p-stable, stable for short, if for all β ∈ U(p, τ ) such that β > α, we have β(1) > α(1).
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4. β is the stable successor of α if α, β are stable, β > α and β(1) = α(1)@〈x〉 for some move x in bck(G).
For example, 〈∗〉 is stable (Proof. Assume that β(1) = 〈∗〉 for some β . β, β(1) have the same last move ∗ by Lemma 8.2.
We conclude that β = 〈∗〉).
The elements of U(p, τ ) are finite lists and may be coded by elements of N . Assume that the membership predicates of
T ,M and turn are in O. Then the set U(p, τ ) is in O. Therefore the predicate ‘‘α is stable’’ is the universal quantification of
some predicate in O. Thus, the predicate ‘‘α is stable’’ is in O′. We first check some properties of stable plays we need later.
Lemma 10. Fix a game G = (∗,M, T , turn,WE ,WA). Let p be a player, q its opponent. Denote by α = 〈x0, . . . , xi〉,
β = 〈y0, . . . , yj〉, and γ = 〈z0, . . . , zk〉 some positions of bck(G). Assume that τ is a winning strategy for p on bck(G), that
U(p, τ ) is as in Definition 11, and that α is stable. Then:
1. If δ is any (finite or infinite) branch in U(p, τ ), δ ≥ α, then δ(1) ≥ α(1), and the indexes of α(1) are a prefix of the indexes of
δ(1).
2. For all α@〈x〉 ∈ U(p, τ ) we have (α@〈x〉)(1) = α(1)@〈x〉, and x is a child of xi.
3. β is a stable successor of α if and only if: (i) β ∈ U(p, τ ), β > α, yj is a child of xi, and (ii) for no γ ∈ U(p, τ ) such that γ > β ,
we have that zk is a child of xi.
Proof. 1. δ(1) ≥ α(1) follows by definition of stability. Let α(1) = 〈xn0 , . . . , xnh〉. In order to prove the relationship among
indexes, it is enough to prove, by induction on l < h, that xnl+1 is the last child of xnl in all δ ≥ α. By contradiction, we
assume that the last child in δ is xn, for some n > nl+1. Let θ = 〈x0, . . . , xn〉 ≤ δ. Then n is not in α, because nl+1 is the last
child of xnl in α. Thus, n > nh, and nh is (by the Lemma 8.2) the last index of α. Then α < θ . By the induction hypothesis
on all indexesm < l, we have θ (1) = 〈xn0 , . . . , xnl , xn〉. Thus θ (1) has l+ 2 elements, and l+ 2 ≤ h+ 1 because l < h. By
the fact that α is stable and α < θ , we also deduce that α(1) < θ (1). Thus, θ (1) has more than h+ 1 elements, which is a
contradiction.
2. By Lemma 8.2, the last indexes of α(1), (α@〈x〉)(1) are the last indexes i, i+ 1 of α, α@〈x〉. By point 1 above, the indexes
of α(1) are a prefix of the indexes of (α@〈x〉)(1). Thus, (α@〈x〉)(1) = α(1)@〈x〉. By Lemma 8.1, we conclude that x is a child
of xi.
3. Assume (i), (ii), γ = 〈z0, . . . , zk〉 ∈ U(p, τ ), and γ > β > α, in order to prove γ (1) > β(1) and β(1) = α(1)@〈yj〉. By
the fact that α, β are stable, we deduce that α(1) < β(1) < γ (1). By point 1 above, the indexes of α(1) are a prefix of the
indexes of β(1), γ (1), and are a proper prefix because α(1) < β(1), γ (1). Since yj is a child of xi, and xi is the last element
of α(1), then yj is the last child of xi in β , and β(1) = α(1)@〈yj〉. Since the indexes of α(1) are a proper prefix of the indexes
of γ (1), yj is also the last child of xi in γ , therefore γ (1) ≥ α(1)@〈yj〉 = β(1). By Lemma 8.2, the last element of γ (1) is zk.
zk is not equal to yj because zk is not a child of xi. Thus, γ (1) > β(1).
The reverse is immediate. 
Wenowprove that if phas awinning strategy inbck(G), then any stable play inwhich pmovesnext has a stable successor.
Using this fact we will define a winning strategy for p in G, which is recursive in O′ if the components of G are in O.
Lemma 11. Fix any game G = (∗,M, T , turn,WE ,WA). Let p be any player, q its opponent. Denote by α = 〈x0, . . . , xi〉,
β = 〈y0, . . . , yj〉, and γ = 〈z0, . . . , zk〉 some positions of bck(G).
Assume that τ is a winning strategy for p on bck(G), that U(p, τ ) is as in Definition 11, and that α is stable. Then:
1. If turn(α) 6= p, and x is a bck.-free move from α, then α@〈x〉 is a stable successor of α.
2. If turn(α) = p, then some β > α is a stable successor of α.
Proof. 1. Assume turn(α) 6= p, α@〈x〉 ∈ bck(G), and that x is a bck.-free move. By the fact that σ is a p-strategy and
α ∈ U ⊆ σ , we deduce α@〈x〉 ∈ σ , hence α@〈x〉 ∈ U(p, τ ) by the fact that x is a bck.-free move. By Lemma 10.3, we have
to prove if β > α@〈x〉, then yj is not a child of xi. If it were, since turn(xi) 6= p, then yj is a move by q, and a child of yj−1
(q does not backtrack on β because β ∈ U(p, τ )). By the uniqueness of the father, yj−1 = xi. Let γ = 〈y0, . . . , yj−1〉 be
obtained by removing the last element of β . Then γ ≥ α@〈x〉, and γ (1) is the list of ancestors of xi, therefore γ (1) = α(1),
contradicting the fact that α is stable.
2. By contradiction, assume that turn(α) = p, but that for no β > α we have that β is stable and β(1) = α(1)@〈yj〉. Since
turn(α) = p, and p follows τ in α, there is some β = α@〈x〉 ∈ U(p, τ ). By Lemma 10.2, x is a child of xi. By Lemma 10.2
and contraposition, for all β ∈ U(p, τ ) such that β > α and yj child of xi, there is some γ ∈ U(p, τ ) such that γ > β and
zk is a child of xi. We deduce that there is some infinite sequence α < β = δ1 < δ2 < δ3 < · · · in U(p, τ ), such that
the last element of each δn is some child of xi. There is some infinite branch δ in U(p, τ ) extending α and all δn, and xi has
infinitely many children in δ. By the fact that α is stable and Lemma 10.1, we obtain α(1) ≤ δ(1). Since xi has infinitely
many children in δ, then δ(1) stops at xi. p loses in δ since turn(xi) = p. Since δ is a branch of U(p, τ ), p follows τ in δ and
pwins δ. Therefore we obtain a contradiction. 
Assume that the components of G are in O, and fix any map in O enumerating U(p, τ ). By Lemma 11.2, if α is stable
there is a first stable β > α (in the enumeration of U(p, τ )) such that β(1) = α(1)@〈y〉 for some y. We can compute β by
minimalization inO′, because being stable is a predicate ofO′. We are now ready to state and prove the following theorem.
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Theorem 1. Let O be any recursive degree. Assume G = (∗,M, T , turn,WE ,WA) is a game, and M, T , turn ∈ O. Let p be a
player. Then:
p wins bck(G) with some strategy τ of degree O⇒ p wins G with some strategy σ of degree O′.
Proof. We can define σ in Gbck-f instead of in G, because the two games have a recursive isomorphism. Let α = 〈x0, . . . , xn〉
be a play of Gbck-f (equivalently, xi+1 is a child of xi in T , for all 0 ≤ i < n). By induction over α, we define two maps
φ,Φ ∈ O′, such that, if σ is the strategy associated with φ, and p follows σ in α, then α = Φ(α)(1). If α = 〈x0〉, we set
Φ(α) = α. AssumeΦ(α) is already defined.
- If turn(xn) = p and Φ(α) is stable, then by Lemma 11.2 we may compute in O′ the first stable δ > Φ(α) such that
δ(1) = Φ(α)(1)@〈y〉 for some y ∈ G. We set φ(α) = y andΦ(α@〈x〉) = δ, for all children x of xn.
- Otherwise, we set φ(α) = 〈∗〉 (a dummy value) andΦ(α@〈x〉) = Φ(α)@〈x〉, for all children x of xn.
By induction on β and Lemma 11, we can prove that if α = 〈x0, . . . , xn〉 is any play of Gbck-f and p follows σ in α, then
Φ(α) is stable and α = Φ(α)(1). We can simultaneously prove that Φ(β) < Φ(α) for all β < α (that Φ is an increasing
map), and that if turn(α) = p, then φ(α) is a child of xn. From this latter we deduce that σ is well-defined, and if p follows
σ then pwins all finite plays of Gbck-f. FromΦ(α) stable we deduceΦ(α) ∈ U(p, τ ), therefore p follows τ in α.
We have to check that any infinite play α = 〈x0, . . . , xn, . . .〉 of G in which p follows σ is won by p. Let αn = 〈x0, . . . , xn〉
for all n ∈ N . Then {Φ(αn)}n is an infinite sequence of lists increasing by prefix in U(p, τ ) (because {αn}n is increasing, andΦ
is an increasing map). Let β be the only infinite extension of allΦ(αn). Since p follows τ in β and τ is winning, then pwins
β(1) in G. By assumption, αn = Φ(αn)(1) ≤ β(1)(by the fact that Φ(αn) is stable, β is a branch of U(p, τ ), and Lemma 10.1).
Thus, α ≤ β(1). From the fact that α is infinite we conclude that α = β(1), and that pwins α.
This ends the proof of Theorem 1. 
7. Adding 1-backtracking to strategies
In this section we prove Theorem 2. We assume that we have fixed some game G = 〈∗,M, T , turn,WE ,WA〉, and some
recursive degree O. We denote by O′ the jump of O. We claim that any winning strategy σ of degree O′ for G may be
effectively transformed into some winning strategy of degree O for bck(G) (more precisely, into some winning strategy
using only non-trivial moves). This result requires a weak hypothesis over G, namely the Liveness condition. Liveness
condition generalizes the condition that the players alternate (see Section 5).
We first include a proof sketch of Theorem 2, in the particular case of a Tarski game for a prenex formula with four
quantifiers, having alternating players, and of O = 0. This proof sketch is taken from [8]. Let F be any Σ04 -prenex formula∃x1∀y1∃x2∀y2R(x1, y1, x2, y2), for some recursive predicate R. The Tarski game G for F is a four-move game. Assume there is
a winning strategy of recursive degree 1 for G. By unfolding the definition of winning strategy, there are degree 1 total maps
f () and g(y1) such that R(f (), y1, g(y1), y2) is true for all y1, y2 ∈ N . We have to define a recursive strategy for the Tarski
game with 1-backtracking for F .
We say that a k-ary map φ is the integer limit of a (k + 1)-ary map ψ , for n → ∞, and we write φ(x1, . . . , xn) =
limn→∞ ψ(n, x1, . . . , xn), if for all a1, . . . , ak ∈ N there is some n such that for all m ≥ n we have φ(a1, . . . , ak) =
ψ(m, a1, . . . , ak). By a result of Classical Recursion Theory ([11]), every map of degree 1 is the integer limit of some map
of degree 0. Moreover, if f , g are as above, we can effectively find, from the integer codes for f , g , some integer codes for
total recursive maps h, k such that f () = limt→∞ h(t) and g(y1) = limt→∞ k(t, y1) for all y1 ∈ N . We define an E-winning
strategy using the maps h, k.
E moves h(0) for ∃x1, and, after A’s move b1 for ∀y1, she moves k(0, b1) for ∃x2. If E wins after A’s move b2 for ∀y2,
she stops. Otherwise, we define a non-trivial move (see Definition 10) for E . If E loses, then R(h(0), b1, k(0, b1), b2) is
false. There is some t1 > 0 such that either h(t1) 6= h(0), or k(t1, b1) 6= k(0, b1): otherwise we would have f () = h(0)
and g(b1) = k(0, b1), and therefore R(h(0), b1, k(0, b1), b2) would be true. E computes the first t1 > 0 such that either
h(t1) 6= h(0), or k(t1, b1) 6= k(0, b1). If h(t1) 6= h(0), then E backtracks to ∃x1. This time, she moves h(t1) for ∃x1: this is a
non-trivialmove, because h(t1) 6= h(0). AfterA’smove b(1)1 for∀y1, E plays k(t1, b(1)1 ) for∃x2 (again, a non-trivialmove), then
A plays some b(1)2 . If h(t1) = h(0) but k(t1, b1) 6= k(0, b1), then E backtracks to ∃x2. This time, she plays k(t1, b1) for ∃x2: this
is a non-trivial move, because k(t1, b1) 6= k(0, b1). ThenA plays some b(1)2 . As E ’s first move for ∃x1 we keep h(t1) = h(0).
As A’s first move for ∀y1, we keep b(1)1 ≡ b1. The game continues in this manner. As long as R(b(i)1 , h(ti), k(ti, b(i)1 ), b(i)2 ) is
false, E defines some (possibly infinite) sequence t0 = 0 < t1 < t2 < · · ·, such that ti+1 > ti, and either h(ti+1) 6= h(ti), or
k(ti+1, b(i)1 ) 6= k(ti, b(i)1 ), where b(i)1 , b(i)2 are defined asA’s last moves for ∀y1 and ∀y2.
By contradiction, assume that E loses. This holds only when the play continues forever. Then h(ti) eventually converges
to f (). Assume h(ti) = f () for all i ≥ i0. E never backtracks to ∃x1 after i0, because h(ti) does not change after i0. Then A’s
move b ≡ b(i0)1 for ∀y1 is kept as value of b(i)1 for all i ≥ i0, since E never backtracks beyond ∃x2. Eventually, k(ti, b) converges
to g(b) and then R(b(i)1 , h(ti), k(ti, b
(i)
1 ), b
(i)
2 ) ≡ R(b, h(ti), k(ti, b), b(i)2 ) ≡ R(b, f (), g(b), b(i)2 ) is true, which is a contradiction.
Now we consider the general case (any game and any recursive degree), and we provide a formal proof. By assumption
on σ , there is somemap φ associated with σ such that φ ∈ O′ (σ has the same role of f , g in the example above). By a result
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of Classical Recursion Theory [11], for some φ(.)(.) ∈ O and all x ∈ T , φ(x) is the integer limit of φt(x), for t →∞. For any
t ∈ N , the map φt(.) is associated with some p-strategy σt on G (σt has the same role of h(t), k(t, .) in the example above).
σt can be a bad strategy for p: for instance, σt could be not well-defined.
Our goal is to define some ψ ∈ O, associated with a winning p-strategy τ on bck(G).
We first check that for all x ∈ T , t ∈ N there is some a ≥ t such that σa is well-defined at least on all prefixes of x.
Another property we need is that the predicate ‘‘σ is well-defined on x’’ is computable w.r.t. the maps φ, turn and the
set T .
Lemma 12. Let G = 〈∗,M, T ,WE ,WA〉 be a game, and σ a strategy on G with the associated map φ.
1. the predicate ‘‘σ well-defined on x’’ is computable w.r.t. T , turn, and the restriction of φ to all y ≤ x. Indeed, σ is well-defined
on x ∈ T if and only if: ‘‘either φ(y) 6≤ x for some y < x such that turn(y) = p, or turn(x) 6= p, or x@〈φ(x)〉 ∈ T ’’.
2. Assume σ is a well-defined p-strategy on G, and for some φ(.)(.) and all x ∈ N, φ(x) is the integer limit of φt(x), for t →∞.
Let x be any position of G. Then for some k and all a ≥ k, σa is well-defined on all prefixes of x.
Proof. 1. By Lemma 1 and the definition of associated map, the condition of point 1 is equivalent to ‘‘either x 6∈ σ , or
turn(x) 6= p or x has a unique child in σ ’’. This latter is equivalent to: ‘‘if x ∈ σ and turn(x) = p, then x has a unique
child in σ ’’, which is the unfolding of ‘‘σ well-defined on x’’.
2. For some k and all a ≥ k we have φa(y) = φ(y) for all prefixes y of x. Fix some a ≥ k, and some prefix y0 of x. By
assumption, σ is well-defined on y0. By point 1 above, either φ(z) 6≤ y0 for some z < y0 such that turn(z) = p, or
turn(y0) 6= p, or y0@〈φ(y0)〉 ∈ T . By φa(y) = φ(y) for all y prefixes of x, we deduce the same condition, but with φ(.)
replaced by φa(.). By point 1 again, σa is well-defined on y0. 
We can now define a map ψ associated with a strategy τ on bck(G) using the family of maps {φt(.)}t .
Definition 12 (The Map ψ). Let G = 〈∗,M, T , turn,WE ,WA〉 be a game, with T , turn ∈ O. Assume σ is a well-defined
p-strategy on G, with associated map φ ∈ O′. Assume that for some φ(.)(.) ∈ O and all x ∈ N , φ(x) is the integer limit of
φt(x), for t →∞. Let β = 〈x0, . . . , xt〉 be a play of bck(G). Take the first a ≥ t such that φa(.) is well-defined on all prefixes
of xt . Then we define a map ψ by
ψ(β) = xi@〈φa(xi)〉
for the first i ≤ t such that xi@〈φa(xi)〉 is a non-trivial move from β in bck(G). We define τ as the only strategy associated
with ψ .
We have ψ ∈ O, because φ(.)(.), T , turn ∈ O, and ψ is recursive in φ(.)(.), T , turn by Lemma 12.1. By Lemma 12.2, for
all t there is some a ≥ t such that σa is well-defined on all prefixes of x. Therefore, by Lemma 9, there is some i ≤ t such that
xi@〈φa(xi)〉 is a non-trivial move from β . Thus, ψ is a total map. The associated strategy τ is well-defined, because ψ(β) is
always a legal move from β . We claim that, for all plays β of bck(G) in which p follows τ , the limit of β is (isomorphic to) a
play in which p follows σ in G, provided that pmoves infinitely many times in β .
Lemma 13. Let σ , τ , φ, ψ , p, G as in the last definition. Fix a finite or infinite play β = 〈x0, x1, x2, . . .〉 of bck(G) such that
β ∈ τ . Take any xt such that turn(xt) = p. Then:
1. xt+1 = xi@〈φa(xi)〉 for some i ≤ t such that xi ≤ xt , and for some a ≥ t.
2. xt has finitely many children in β .
3. Either p moves only finitely many times, or p follows σ in β(1).
Proof. 1. By the definition of τ and β ∈ τ .
2. For some k and all h ≥ k we have φ(xt) = φh(xt). In order to prove that xt has finitely many children in β , it is enough
to prove that xt has at most one child with index greater than t, k. Assume for contradiction that there are two children
xm+1, xm′+1 of xt in β , which are consecutive in the set of children of xt in β , and such that t, k ≤ m < m′. By definition of
1-backtrackingwe have turn(xm) = turn(xt) = p and turn(xm′) = turn(xt) = p. By point 1 and the uniqueness of the
father xt of xm+1, xm′+1, we deduce that xm+1 = xt@〈φa(xt)〉 and xm′+1 = xt@〈φa′(xt)〉, for some a ≥ m and a′ ≥ m′. Then
a, a′ ≥ k, and therefore xm+1 = xt@〈φa(xt)〉 = xt@〈φ(xt)〉 = xt@〈φa′(xt)〉 = xm′+1 by the choice of k. By the definition
of τ , however, we have xm+1 6= xm′+1, because xm+1, xm′+1 are consecutive in the set of children of xt in β , and τ only
makes non-trivial moves. Therefore τ cannot make a move xm′+1 which is equal to its last brother xm+1. This results in a
contradiction.
3. Let β(1) = 〈xt0 , xt1 , xt2 , . . .〉. Assume that pmoves infinitely many times (hence β is infinite). Wewill prove, by induction
over i, that if turn(xti) = p, then xti+1 exists and it is equal to xti@〈φ(xti)〉. We first prove that it exists. By Lemma 8.1, xti+1
is a child of xti . If we combine this with point 2, xti has a finite non-empty set of children of index greater than ti. Thus, xti+1
exists, and it is the last child xm of xti inβ withm > ti. It remains to check that xm = xti@〈φ(xti)〉. By contradiction, assume
that xm 6= xti@〈φ(xti)〉. For some k, all h ≥ k, and all j ≤ i we have φ(xtj) = φh(xtj). By assumption p moves infinitely
many times, therefore there is some move xh of p, with index h ≥ k,m + 1. Then xm 6= xti@〈φ(xti)〉 = xti@〈φh(xti)〉. By
the inductive assumption, xtj+1 = xtj@〈φ(xtj)〉 = xtj@〈φh(xtj)〉 for all j < i such that turn(xtj) = p. If we combine the
last two remarks, then, by the definition of τ , we conclude thatψ(〈x0, . . . , xh〉) = xti@〈φh(xti)〉 = xti@〈φ(xti)〉. However,
xti@〈φ(xti)〉 is a child of xti of index greater thanm, contradicting the choice of xm as last child. 
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We are now ready to state and prove the second theorem of the paper. Recall that the Liveness condition trivially holds
in the case the two players alternate, or in the case the game is a Tarski game.
Theorem 2. LetO be a recursive degree. Assume that G = (∗,M, T , turn,WE ,WA) is a game, with T , turn ∈ O. Assume that
player p satisfies Liveness in G. Then:
p wins G with some strategy σ of degree O′⇒ p wins bck(G) with some strategy τ of degree O.
Proof. Take τ as in Definition 12 and Lemma 13. We will prove that p wins all plays β in which he follows τ . If β is finite,
then p wins because τ is well-defined. Assume that β is infinite. By assumption, p satisfies the Liveness Condition in G. By
Lemma 7, p satisfies the Liveness condition in bck(G). Therefore if pmoves finitely many times in β , then p wins. Assume
pmoves infinitely many times. Then p follows σ in β(1) by Lemma 13.3. p wins β(1) because σ is winning, and therefore p
wins β . 
8. 1-backtracking plays and Limit Computable Mathematics
In this section we will prove that the games of the form bck(G) are a sound and complete semantics for LCM. For a
compact definition of LCMwe refer to the final page of [8], or to Appendix.
We first have to make precise which is the minimum recursive degree of a winning strategy for E on G(A). Let L be the
language for Arithmetic, introduced in Section 2. We define the degree of the formula A ∈ L as the height n ∈ N of the
subformula tree of A (n = 0 if A is atomic). For any recursive predicate P , we define P⊥ as the complement of P . For any
A ∈ L, we define A⊥ by switching P and P⊥, ∧ and ∨, ∀ and ∃ in A. A⊥ is equivalent to ¬A, but A⊥ ∈ L while (¬A) 6∈ L
(we have no negation in L). There is some A(x) ∈ L denoting some unary predicate of degree n as formula, whose Turing
equivalence class is the recursive degree n. We refer to [11] for proof: the actual choice of A(x) does not matter. We define
Excluded Middle for formulas of degree n by EMn = ∀x.(A(x) ∨ A(x)⊥). By construction, EMn ∈ L0 and EMn is a formula of
degree n + 2. We now prove a result about the minimum recursive degree of a winning strategy for a formula A ∈ L0 of
degree n+ 2.
Lemma 14. Assume that A ∈ L0 is a true formula of degree≤ n+ 2. Then:
1. E has some recursive winning strategy of degree n on G(A).
2. If A = EMn, then A has degree n+ 2, and the minimum recursive degree for a winning strategy of E on G(A) is exactly n.
Proof. We use the fact that there is a map of recursive degree n deciding all formulas of L0 of degree≤ n.
1. Let us consider the strategy σA defined by σA(B) = the first true immediate subformula C of B in a given ordering, if any
exists, as in Lemma 2. σA(B) is undefined if there is no true immediate subformula of B. We check that σA has recursive
degree n. If A has degree n + 1 and α is any play of G(A), then the binary map: A, α 7→ σA(α) has recursive degree n,
because E in G(A) has only to decide formulas of degree ≤ n, and there is an oracle of recursive degree n for this task.
Assume that A has degree n + 2, and A moves first. If A moves from A to some B, then B is true, and E wins using the
strategy σB, which may be computed in the argument B. This defines a winning strategy σ for E of recursive degree n.
Assume that A has degree n+ 2, and E moves first. Then there is some true immediate subformula of A: let B be the first
such formula. E wins by playing B from A, then playing according to σB. This defines a winning strategy for E of recursive
degree n.
2. Assume EMn = ∀x.P(x) ∨ P⊥(x), for some predicate P of recursive degree n. EMn has degree n+ 1. A winning strategy σ
for E may be used to decide P(x), as follows.A first plays P(m)∨ P⊥(m). If E plays P(m), then she has a winning strategy
for P(m) and P(m) is true. If E plays P⊥(m), then she has a winning strategy for P⊥(m) and P⊥(m) is true. We conclude
that P(x) is Turing-reducible to σ , therefore σ has recursive degree ≥ n. By the previous point, the minimum recursive
degree for a winning strategy for E is n. 
Remark that if A ∈ L0 is true of degree 0, 1, then there are constant (and therefore recursive) winning strategies for E
on G(A). We may characterize in terms of bckk(G) the arithmetical formulas of L0 having a winning strategy of recursive
degree n, and true arithmetical formulas, and, especially, formulas true in the Limit Realization Interpretation of Arithmetic.
Corollary 1.5 was an open problem in [4] (p. 5).
Corollary 1. Let A ∈ L be any positive arithmetical formula (i.e., without⇒,¬), and let G(A) be the Tarski game associated with
A. Let k, n ∈ N. Assume the degree of A (the height of the subformula tree) is n + 2. Let EMn be Excluded Middle for degree n
formulas (see above).
1. E has some winning strategy of recursive degree k on G(A)⇔ E has some winning recursive strategy on bckk(G(A)).
2. A is true⇔ E wins G(A)⇔ E wins bckn(G(A)) with some recursive strategy.
3. If A = EMn, then E wins G(A), has no recursive winning strategy for bck0(G(A)), . . . , bckn−1(G(A)), and has some recursive
winning strategy for bckn(G(A)).
4. A is true in the Limit Realization Interpretation if and only if E wins bck(G(A))with some recursive strategy.
5. The set of A such that E wins bck(G(A)) with some recursive strategy is closed under all intuitionistic rules, but not under all
classical rules.
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Proof. 1. G(A) has only finite plays, therefore E trivially satisfies Liveness in G(A). By Lemma 7, for all h ∈ N , E satisfies
Liveness in bckh(G(A)). The thesis follows from Theorems 1 and 2 applied k times.
2. Since the formula A has degree n + 2, then A is true if and only if E wins G(A) with some strategy of recursive degree n
(Lemma 14.1). The thesis follows from point 1 above, with k = n.
3. The minimum recursive degree for a winning strategy for E on G(EMn) is n (Lemma 14.2). The thesis follows from point
1 above, with k = n.
4. A is true in Limit Realization Interpretation if and only if E wins G(A)with some strategy of recursive degree 1. The thesis
follows from point 1 above, with k = 1.
5. Closure under intuitionistic rules follows from point 4, and from the closure of Limit Computability Interpretation under
all intuitionistic rules. For the second part, consider the classical theorem EM2. By point 3, with n = 2, there is no recursive
winning strategy for E on bck(G(EM2)). 
9. Conclusions and future works
In this paper we introduced 1-backtracking, a sound and complete game semantics for LCM, which is a proper subset of
true arithmetical formulas. We proved that adding 1-backtracking allows to reduce of one unit the recursive degree of a
winning strategy for E in a game. Our semantics is inspired by the idea of learning by trial-and-error, and should be useful
for studying the constructive content of some (not all) classical theorems.
There are other results connecting 1-backtracking game semantics with some subsets of classical truth. In [3], Berardi
and Yamagata showed that, if we drop Exchange rule from Sequent Calculus with ω-rule, we define a semi-formal system
PA1, deriving exactly all positive arithmetical formulas (i.e., without⇒ and ¬) valid in 1-backtracking game semantics, or
equivalently, valid in LCM. Therefore 1-backtrackingmay be characterized by a substructural logic. There is a Church–Rosser
isomorphism between infinitary proofs of a formula A in PA1 on one side, and winning strategy with 1-backtracking for
E for the associated Tarski game G(A) on the other side. The idea behind this isomorphism is that if we have a sequent
Γ = A1, . . . , An and we drop the possibility of permutating formulas, then we may interpret Γ as the history of some play
with 1-backtracking.
Another result connects 1-backtracking and the part of the ExcludedMiddle Schema used in a classical proof. Berardi and
Tatsuta [2] proved that the set of all positive arithmetical formulas valid in the 1-backtracking game semantics is exactly the
set of positive arithmetical formulas which are consequences of EM1 in Intuitionistic Heyting Arithmetic with ω-rule. This
provides, indirectly, another characterization of LCM. LCM is a subclassical arithmetic in which we have Excluded Middle
only for formulas of degree 1.
A last result is about the generalization of the notion of 1-backtracking. Berardi and de’ Liguoro [1] analyzed the pointer
structure of a play with backtracking in Coquand’s game semantics [4,5], and introduced a measure α of complexity for the
backtracking used in a play. α can be any ordinal: when α = 1, we re-obtain 1-backtracking in the sense of this paper.
α-backtracking provides a stratification of Coquand’s backtracking in increasing order of complexity.
These results suggest that we should be able to use n-backtracking for a low value of n (say, n = 1, 2) to provide simpler
constructive interpretation for classical results which do not require in their proof the entire schema of Excluded Middle,
but only a part of it (say, EM1 or EM2).
Eventually, we ask ourselves if the results proved for 1-backtrackingmay be generalized to n-backtracking, for any n ∈ N ,
and even to α-backtracking for α any ordinal. Fix any positive arithmetical formulas A. We conjecture:
1. if A has degree n, then A is classically true if and only if it E has a winning strategy for G(A) using n-backtracking.
2. E has a winning strategy for G(A) using n-backtracking if and only if A is a consequence of EMn in Intuitionistic Heyting
Arithmetic with ω-rule.
Appendix. A short introduction to LCM realizability
In this section we briefly introduce the theory of Limit Computable Mathematics, or LCM. This short section is taken
from [8].
Fix any recursive enumeration of∆02, the set of partial recursive maps in an oracle for the Halting Problem. Denote with
{a}′(b) the result (possibly undefined) of the application of the∆02-map number a of the enumeration to b ∈ N . Let 〈., .〉 be
the map coding pairs in N , and pi1, pi2 be the inverse maps, therefore pii(〈a1, a2〉) = ai for all a1, a2 ∈ N .
Definition 13 (Realization Relation of LCM). Assume A is any arithmetical formula, in a language extended with a binary
map {.}′(.), denoting application for codes of∆02-maps, and with two unary maps pi1, pi2 denoting projections. For any fresh
variable a, we define a formula a r A in the same language. We read a r A as ‘‘a realizes A’’. The definition of a r A runs by
induction on A.
1. a r (s = t) ≡ (s = t)
2. a r A ∧ B ≡ pi1(a) r A ∧ pi2(a) r B
3. a r A ∨ B ≡ (pi1(a) = 1 ∧ pi2(a) r A) ∨ (pi1(a) = 2 ∧ pi2(a) r B)
4. a r A→ B ≡ ∀x. x r A→ {a}′(x) r B
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5. a r ∀x.A ≡ ∀x.{a}′(x) r A
6. a r ∃x.A ≡ pi2(a) r A[x/pi1(a)].
Remark that, in the definition above, s = t is the equality predicate of two expressions s, t possibly including the binary
map {.}′(.). We interpret s = t by ‘‘s, t are both undefined, or both defined and equal’’. In this way we may assign a truth
value to each formula n r A, for any closed A and any constant n ∈ N . LCM is the set of closed arithmetical formulas A such
that ∃a.a r A. The difference with the standard Realization interpretation is that we consider an enumeration of ∆02-partial
maps, instead of ∆01-partial maps (of partial recursive maps). The name LCM, or ‘‘Limit Computable Mathematics’’, comes
from the fact that each map in ∆02 is the limit of some recursive map. We say that each map in ∆
0
2 is ‘‘limit recursive’’, for
short. Realizers in LCM are limit recursive.
If A is→-free, we can interpret a r A by: a defines a ∆02-winning strategy for the Tarski game associated with A. If a r A
holds in the original definition of realization, the onewith∆01-maps, then a defines a recursivewinning strategy for the Tarski
game associated with A.
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